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I. INTRODUCTION.
Over 200 years ago, the founding fathers equipped our nation
with a document affording all citizens some basic, constitutional
198
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protections. For centuries, these protections existed unchanged.1
But as time passed, society's need to maintain order and safety be-
gan to threaten these protections. In the 1970s, an exception to the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution surfaced, giv-
ing police the ability to respond to emergency situations at the ex-
pense of individual Fourth Amendment protections.2 The excep-
tion, called the community caretaking doctrine, allows police offic-
ers to forgo Fourth Amendment protection to engage in community
caretaking functions for society's greater benefit.
3
In the past forty years, courts have adopted this exception and
interpreted it differently. Some courts have applied the exception
liberally,4 beyond what was intended by the United States Supreme
Court in the decision that adopted the community caretaking doc-
trine.5 Other courts have refused to extend the exception,6 and
some have simply decided not to engage in the debate altogether.
7
Some note that even the United States Supreme Court, which was
the first to apply the doctrine, has spoken so little about it.8
The exception is terrorizing the basic Fourth Amendment protec-
tion that our founding fathers vehemently fought to protect. Apply-
ing the doctrine to circumstances beyond its original intent threat-
ens the very core protections delineated in the Constitution. It is
time to re-prioritize the interests in the Constitution over the inter-
ests of police departments across the nation in maintaining order
and safety.
This article will examine the history of the community caretaking
doctrine, and how it has chipped away at core constitutional protec-
tions. Part II will discuss a doctrine that one may or may not have
ever heard of: the community caretaking doctrine. Oftentimes, peo-
ple know that police officers can forgo the Fourth Amendment for
1. See U.S. CONST. (The United States Constitution is still our nation's governing docu-
ment in the twenty-first century, and the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, still
govern our behavior.).
2. Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 272 (1998) (discussing the community caretaking doctrine).
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Phillips v. Peddle, 7 F. App'x 175, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying the com-
munity caretaking doctrine to the warrantless search and seizure of the home).
5. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
6. See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).
7. Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the community
caretaking doctrine to a warrantless search of a vehicle consistent with prior United States
Supreme Court precedent).
8. David L. Hudson, Courts in a Muddle Over 4th Amendment's Community Caretaking
Exception, ABA J. (Aug. 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/courts in a
muddle over 4th amendments-community-caretaking-exception/.
Winter 2019
Duquesne Law Review
the sake of the community, but they do not know the name of this
doctrine. This section will discuss where the doctrine originated,
and what exactly it means for Fourth Amendment protections.
Part III will discuss the problems that many courts are having
with the doctrine: where to apply it and when. There exists a circuit
split as to the way that the doctrine should be used to protected
individuals from overreaching police intrusions. Some courts apply
the doctrine solely to the warrantless search of vehicles. Other
courts apply the doctrine not only to the search of vehicles, but also
to the warrantless search of homes.
Part IV will discuss why the leading case about the community
caretaking doctrine, Cady v. Dombrowski, should be overturned.
The inherent problems with the doctrine, coupled with the fact that
the Court is still unclear about the standards for applying the doc-
trine, prove that the Court's creation of the doctrine was impulsive
and in error. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, and using the doctrine to establish rea-
sonableness for a warrantless search and seizure is, quite frankly,
unreasonable.
Part V will discuss an alternative argument: even if the commu-
nity caretaking doctrine continues to stand, it should be limited,
because it was not the Court's intent to apply the doctrine outside
the context of vehicles. Further, there are significant other reasons,
beyond the Court's intent, as to why the doctrine should be limited.
Any extension of the doctrine beyond the home is unreasonable.
Part VI will discuss the final alternative argument. If the com-
munity caretaking doctrine remains standing as-is, without any
limitations, an exclusionary rule should be applied to restore faith
in police officers and further protect Fourth Amendment principles.
The fruits of the search and seizure, as a result of an officer's use of
the doctrine, should be suppressed in a court of law. Indeed, if
courts adopt this latter argument, then, at the very least, citizens
will feel more confident in their local police departments and per-
haps be more cooperative with them.
II. WHAT IS THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING DOCTRINE, AND
WHERE DID IT COME FROM?
The framing document of the United States' government, the
United States Constitution, was drafted to "combin[e] the requisite
stability and energy in government, with the inviolable attention
200 Vol. 57
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due to liberty and to the republican form."9 The Anti-Federalists,
who vehemently sought to limit a strong, centralized government,
refused to ratify the Constitution without a Bill of Rights.10 They
claimed the Constitution did not contain a specific declaration
about what the government could not do to basic, individual
rights.1 Written to pacify these concerns, the founding fathers
wrote the Bill of Rights to protect individual citizens' rights from
government usurpation.
12
It is the Fourth Amendment within the Bill of Rights that pro-
tects the right against unreasonable searches and seizures-a right
that these original citizens believed to be naturally theirs.13 It pro-
vides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
14
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches or sei-
zures-only those deemed unreasonable.15 Reasonableness is set
forth as the substantive command of the Fourth Amendment.16 Alt-
hough reasonableness has been set forth as the overarching norm,
determining the meaning of reasonableness has been deemed an
"elusive goal."
17
It is undisputed that the "ultimate touchstone" of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness.1 8 Scholars observe that no other
provision of the Constitution mandates such an "open-ended inter-
pretation" that requires 'constructions that change with changing
circumstances."'' 19 They note that reasonableness i not determined
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison).
10. The Bill of Rights: A Brief History, AM. C.L. UNION, http://www.aclu.org/other/bill-




14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Dana Raigrodski, Reasonablness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth
Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 158 (2008).
18. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
17.Raigrodski, supra note 17, at 158 (quoting Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994)).
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by any fixed formula.20 In fact, the Constitution does not define
what is an unreasonable search,21 and consequently, there is ."no
ready litmus paper test"' available.
22
Reasonableness i generally determined by a balancing of inter-
ests.2 3 In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is calcu-
lated by balancing the government's interests in conducting
searches or seizures with the personal privacy and liberty interests
invaded by them.24 In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court explained the rea-
sonableness tandard:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each
case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search
entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intru-
sion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
2 5
Only unreasonable searches violate Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.26 In essence, the text of the Fourth Amendment imposes two
requirements on law enforcement: (1) all searches and seizures
must be reasonable, and (2) probable cause must be established be-
fore a warrant is issued and that warrant must state, with particu-
larity, the scope of the search.
27
For much of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court held that the validity of a search was contingent on the pres-
ence or absence of a search warrant.28 With this view in mind, if an
officer obtained advance judicial authorization for a search in the
form of a search warrant, then the search was presumed reasona-
ble.2 9 A warrant required probable cause.3 0 A search or seizure on
private premises without a warrant is still considered unreasonable
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950)).
23. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996).
24. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
25. 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 558.
27. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
28. Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reason-
ableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1134-35 (2012).




under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a well-estab-
lished exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
31
In the 1970s, one such exception emerged. The community care-
taking doctrine was first recognized by the Court in Cady v. Dom-
browski.3 2 The case centered around Chester Dombrowski, a police
officer in the city of Chicago.33 On the night in question, Dom-
browski had driven from Chicago to Wisconsin.3 4 Dombrowski's car
broke down on the side of the road in Wisconsin.3 5 Dombrowski
trekked to a local tavern, where he called the police.36 After Dom-
browski phoned the police, two Wisconsin officers picked Dom-
browski up at the local tavern, and drove him to the scene of the
accident.3 7 The officers noticed that Dombrowski was very drunk.
38
Because the Wisconsin officers believed that Chicago police offic-
ers were required by regulation to carry their service revolvers at
all times, they attempted to locate Dombrowski's service revolver
on his person.3 9 Unable to find the service revolver, the officers took
Dombrowski to the police station, where he was formally arrested
for drunken driving.40 Still concerned that Dombrowski did not
have his service revolver on him, one of the officers went to look for
the revolver in Dombrowski's vehicle that had since been towed.41
Upon examination of the vehicle, the officer found incriminating ev-
idence implicating Dombrowski in a murder.42
The lower courts concluded that the warrantless search of Dom-
browski's vehicle was unconstitutional and that the seized items
from the vehicle were inadmissible at his trial.43 However, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that the items were con-
stitutionally seized.44 It determined that "[l]ocal police officers ...
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim
31. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980) (noting that property maybe seized
in plain view because there is no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable).
32. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
33. Id. at 435.
34. Id.
35. Id.





41. Id. at 437.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 444.
44. Id. at 449.
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of criminal liability and engage in ... community caretaking func-
tions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisi-
tion of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."
45
The Court's use of the words "totally divorced" authorized a war-
rantless search and seizure when the officers' actions were com-
pletely separate from the officers' investigation or suspicion of crim-
inal activity.46 For example, imagine an officer who is responding
to a neighborhood break-in. The officer walks through the neigh-
borhood to question each neighbor about whether they have re-
cently been victims of a burglary. The officer knocks on a neighbor's
door, but there is no answer. The officer, confused because he sees
a car with its engine running in the driveway, enters the neighbor's
unlocked home. The officer cannot find anyone on the main floor,
so he decides to check the basement to see if the neighbor is down
there. When the officer enters the basement, he finds a meth lab.
Now, the neighbor faces drug charges and a prison sentence. The
evidence of the meth lab can be used against her at her trial.
Clearly, the officer did not have a warrant to search the neighbor's
home. However, because the officer was engaging in community
caretaking functions by checking on the neighbor, a warrant was
not required. The evidence the officer found is admissible because
the officer's actions in entering the home were totally divorced from
the acquisition of the evidence of the meth lab.
The Court decided that encounters like these, where police are
simply responding as "community caretakers," are reasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment because they lack an investigatory pur-
pose.47 The officer in the above example neither entered the neigh-
bor's home to investigate a drug crime nor to continue his investi-
gation into home burglaries. Similarly, the officers in Cady lacked
an investigatory purpose when they sought to find Dombrowski's
service revolver.48 Instead of finding the revolver, however, they
found the fruits of a murder.49 Moreover, the same doctrine out-
lined in Cady has been applied to warrantless automobile searches
in circumstances unlike those found in Cady.50 Rather than focus-
ing on the facts in Cady, many state and federal courts distinguish
45. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. Mary Elisabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth
Amendment Exception, 26 Am. J. CRIM. L. 325, 338 (1999).
48. Cady, 413 U.S. at 437 (stating the purpose of searching the vehicle was to locate the
service revolver, consistent with the police department's standard procedure).
49. Id.
50. Naumann, supra note 47, at 351 (describing the Second and Sixth Circuit application
of the doctrine outside of the Cady circumstances).
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between investigatory and non-investigatory functions, extending
the application of this doctrine far beyond the facts of Cady.51 Many
courts utilize this doctrine to justify initial encounters and subse-
quent intrusions in other circumstances where officers are acting
as "community caretakers" generally.52 Thus, Cady has sparked an
endless debate about the situations in which the community care-
taking exception applies.
In November of 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided
for the first time whether Pennsylvania recognizes the community
caretaking doctrine as an exception to the Fourth Amendment.
53
This decision illustrates the trends that courts are following: to sub-
sequently bless the holding in Cady and recognize the doctrine
within their own jurisdictions.54 These courts have come to recog-
nize that community caretaking functions include a vast array of
everyday police activities, most of which are intended to aid com-
munity members in danger of physical harm, and to create a sense
of security within their own community.55 Typically, community
caretaking functions include activities like checking on noise dis-
putes, attending to stray animals, and welfare checks on the el-
derly.56
Initially, the doctrine appears to be very narrow: it protects law
enforcement officers' intrusions when they are engaging in commu-
nity caretaking functions.57 However, some jurisdictions interpret
the doctrine quite broadly.58 These jurisdictions recognize that the
doctrine encompasses multiple other Fourth Amendment excep-
tions, making it so broad. 59 One of these exceptions is the emer-
gency aid doctrine, where an officer has an immediate, reasonable
belief that a serious, dangerous event is occurring.60 Another ex-
ception is the exigent circumstance exception, which applies when
51. Id.
52. Id. at 352.
53. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017).
54. Naumann, supra note 47, at 351-52 (noting that a myriad of federal and state courts
have adopted the doctrine but have added further nuances to it, making the doctrine differ
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
55. Livingston, supra note 2.
56. Id.
57. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
58. Naumann, supra note 47, at 330.
59. See State v. Blades, 626 A.2d 273, 278 (Conn. 1993) (acknowledging that the emer-
gency aid doctrine is considered a part of the community caretaking function); see also Com-
monwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 626-27 (Pa. 2017) ("The community caretaking doc-
trine has been characterized as encompassing three specific exceptions: the emergency aid
exception; the automobile impoundment/inventory exception; and the public servant excep-
tion, also sometimes referred to as the public safety exception."); Naumann, supra note 47,
at 330.
60. Naumann, supra note 47, at 331.
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the police are acting in their "crime-fighting" role.6 1 Despite the
doctrine's intent to aid the community, however, courts are in dis-
cord regarding whether the community caretaking doctrine should
be interpreted broadly or narrowly to encompass these other Fourth
Amendment exceptions. Some courts have observed that, for exam-
ple, the exigencies giving rise to the exigent circumstance exception
speak more to a "residual group of factual situations that do not fit
into other established exceptions,"6 2 i.e., the community caretaking
doctrine. It appears that courts cherry-pick which exception they
want to implicate to ensure that evidence will be admissible and the
bad guy will be punished.6 3 Although courts are inconsistent re-
garding the scope of the doctrine to encompass other exceptions, in-
cluding exigencies, these inconsistencies need not be resolved today.
This inconsistency does demonstrate, however, yet another problem
with the community caretaking doctrine.
III. THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING DOCTRINE AND THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT: DOES ANYONE REALLY KNOW THE BEST INTERPRETATION?
The United States Supreme Court created an outline for how the
community caretaking doctrine applies, but left many questions un-
answered regarding its applicability. In Cady, the Court, arguably,
limited its holding to automobile searches because the facts of the
case pertained to an automobile search.6 4 No language in the hold-
ing explicitly limits the applicability of community caretaker func-
tions to incidents solely regarding automobiles; however, no lan-
guage expands the applicability of community caretaker functions
beyond automobiles.6 5 Further, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently remained silent on whether the doctrine can even be extended
beyond the context of Cady.66 Thus, a circuit split emerged regard-
ing the applicability of the community caretaking doctrine outside
the context of vehicles.
61. Id. at 332.
62. Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995).
63. See, e.g., State v. Comer, 51 P.3d 55, 63, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting the trial
court's use of the emergency aid doctrine, but upholding a warrantless entry by police under
the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment).
64. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
65. Valerie Moss, The Community Caretaking Doctrine: The Necessary Expansion of the
New Fourth Amendment Exception, 85 MISS. L.J. 9, 16 (2017).
66. Hudson, supra note 8.
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The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have erred on the
side of caution and narrowly construed Cady to only apply to vehi-
cles.6 7 The Third Circuit has held that the community caretaking
doctrine categorically does not extend to the warrantless searches
of homes.68 In Ray v. Township of Warren, the court refused to ex-
tend the doctrine to apply to homes because it determined that the
Supreme Court's Cady ruling was expressly based on the distinc-
tion between automobiles and homes in the context of searches.
6 9
The Third Circuit further refused to cast aside the protection of the
sanctity of the home, which was "embedded in our tradition since
the origins of the Republic."70 It also stated that the primary pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment was to guard against an unreason-
able home entry.
71
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Pichany re-
fused to expand the community caretaking doctrine to the searches
of homes or residences.72 In this case, the officers discovered stolen
property when they entered the defendant's warehouse while inves-
tigating the burglary of another nearby warehouse.7 3 Warrantless
searches are presumed unreasonable, and the court rejected the of-
ficers' argument that their warrantless search was justified under
the community caretaking exception.74 The Seventh Circuit rea-
soned that only specifically defined classes of cases are exempt from
the presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable, and the
Supreme Court's holding in Cady did not mean that community
caretaking searches of homes were a part of this defined class.
75
The Ninth Circuit has also adopted a narrow construction of the
community caretaking doctrine. In United States v. Erickson, a po-
lice officer was called to investigate a robbery at the defendant's
home while the defendant was not there.76 While inside the resi-
dence, the officer discovered marijuana plants.77 The Ninth Circuit
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and found
67. See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Bute,
43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that, in a scenario where officers enter a suspi-
cious-looking garage and find methamphetamine, the community caretaking doctrine applies
only to cases involving automobiles); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208 (7th Cir. 1982).
68. Ray, 626 F.3d at 177.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 175 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)).
71. Id.
72. 687 F.2d at 208-09.
73. Id. at 205-06.
74. Id. at 207-08.
75. Id. at 207-09.




the officer's search to be unreasonable in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.78 However, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning differed
from that of the Seventh Circuit. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
police interact with automobiles as a part of their community care-
taking functions on a daily basis, and because of this frequent con-
tact, people generally have a lower expectation of privacy with re-
gards to their vehicles than they do with regards to their homes.
79
In contrast to these circuits, three federal circuits-the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit-have expanded
the community caretaking doctrine to warrantless entries of
homes.80 In United States v. Quezada, the Eighth Circuit held that
an officer can enter a home without a warrant when the officer has
a reasonable belief of the existence of an emergency.81 The officer
in this case went to Quezada's apartment to serve a child protection
order, but after shouting to announce himself several times with no
answer, the officer went inside the apartment and found Quezada
asleep on the floor with a shotgun underneath him.8 2 Quezada was
arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm.8 3 The Eighth
Circuit noted that the shotgun was properly admitted into evidence
because of the distinction between police officers' criminal investi-
gatory functions and their community caretaking functions.
8 4
In United States v. Rohrig, the Sixth Circuit also found that the
community caretaking doctrine exception is a lawful extension of
the doctrine in Cady because the officer's reason for entry into the
defendant's home was unrelated to a criminal investigation, and
thus, the warrant requirement was not directly implicated.8 5 In
Rohrig, officers responded to a noise complaint and entered the de-
fendant's basement, thinking that the music was coming from in-
side.86 Instead, they found a marijuana-growing operation and a
shotgun.8 7 The defendant moved to suppress the drugs and gun, on
the grounds that the entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.88
The court disagreed, stating that "[h]aving found that an important
78. Id.
79. Id. at 532.
80. Naumann, supra note 47, at 350; see United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007
(8th Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Peddle, 7 F. App'x 175, 177 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rohrig,
98 F.3d 1506, 1523 (6th Cir. 1996).
81. 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006).
82. Id. at 1006.
83. Id. at 1007.
84. Id.
85. 98 F.3d 1506, 1523 (6th Cir. 1996).
86. Id. at 1509.




'community caretaking' interest motivated the officers' entry in this
case, we conclude that their failure to obtain a warrant does not
render that entry unlawful."
8 9
The Fourth Circuit also adopted a reasoning similar to the Sixth
Circuit in holding that the community caretaking doctrine extends
to homes, focusing on the distinction between community caretak-
ing functions and functions that are solely for investigating
crimes.90 In Phillips v. Peddle, the officers entered the defendant's
home, without a warrant, to serve a subpoena on the defendant to
testify in an ongoing federal criminal investigation.91 The officers
knocked on the defendant's door, but he did not answer.92 Then,
they saw an unidentified car in the driveway.93 Concerned because
the defendant had spoken to the officers earlier that day, the offic-
ers entered his home.94 The defendant, provoked by the violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights, filed a Section 198395 action against
the officers.96 In response, the court granted the officer in question
qualified immunity.
97
Notably, the First and Second Circuit Courts, by contrast, have
not ruled definitively on whether the community caretaking doc-
trine can justify a warrantless search of a home when not performed
in response to an emergency situation.98 When the exception is dis-
cussed by these circuits, they seem to skirt around the issue, and
offer no clarity as to whether the doctrine is a distinct exception to
the warrant requirement or to what circumstances it applies.99
Outside of the federal context, an increasing number of state
courts have expanded the doctrine to encompass the warrantless
entry of homes. The state of Maryland expanded the doctrine to
homes in 1997 in State v. Alexander.100 The Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia expanded the doctrine to homes in 1995 in Commonwealth v.
89. Id. at 1523.
90. Phillips v. Peddle, 7 F. App'x 175 (4th Cir. 2001).




95. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) (allowing citizens to bring private actions against the Gov-
ernment for a violation of a citizen's constitutional civil rights).
96. Peddle, 7 F. App'x at 177.
97. Id. at 177-78.
98. See MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2014) ("This court has
not decided whether the community caretaking exception applies to police activities involving
a person's home."); Gombert v. Lynch, 541 F. Supp. 2d 492, 504 n.6 (D. Conn. 2008) (acknowl-
edging that the Second Circuit has not addressed the issue).
99. Mark Goreczny, Taking Care While Doing Right by the Fourth Amendment, 14
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 229, 244-46 (2015).
100. 721 A.2d 275 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
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Waters.10 1 The states of California in 1999, South Dakota in 2009,
and Wisconsin in 2013 expanded the doctrine to homes in People v.
Ray,102 State v. Deneui,103 and State v. Gracia,10 4 respectively.
Despite their well-thought out reasoning behind expanding the
doctrine to cover homes and residences, the circuit courts of appeals
and state courts that have expanded the community caretaking doc-
trines to the home have been met with intense criticism. Those who
disagree with the discretion given to police to search homes under
the doctrine have adopted Justice Brennan's warning in his dissent
in Cady: "I can only conclude, therefore, that what the Court does
today in the name of an investigative automobile search is in fact a
serious departure from established Fourth Amendment princi-
ples."10 5 Specifically, those that oppose the doctrine fear that their
privacy rights will be infringed. Privacy expectations reach their
zenith in the home, which is accorded the full range of Fourth
Amendment protections.106 As the Court described in Kentucky v.
King, "[i]t is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' . . . 'that
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are pre-
sumptively unreasonable.'
10 7
It is clear courts vary greatly in their interpretation of how the
community caretaking doctrine applies. Additionally, it is not only
how the doctrine applies that results in so much disparity. Dispar-
ity also results from different interpretations of what is considered
reasonable under the doctrine. To illustrate, the foundation of the
doctrine is that it is reasonable to allow officers to forgo the warrant
requirement when officers are engaging as community caretak-
ers.108 However, courts have changed the reasonableness require-
ments of the doctrine.10 9 This creates even more disparity and con-
fusion. As a result, courts that are interpreting the doctrine have
little to no guidance on how to do so. Essentially, the reasonable-
ness of a warrantless search and seizure is what gives the doctrine
life. If it is not reasonable to cast aside individual's basic constitu-
tional rights, then the doctrine cannot be used to protect officers.
101. 456 S.E.2d 527 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
102. 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999).
103. 775 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 2009).
104. 826 N.W.2d 87 (Wis. 2013).
105. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 454 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
107. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 403 (2006)).
108. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
109. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 610-11 (N.Y. 1976).
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The most influential standard for assessing the reasonableness
of a warrantless search and seizure-when there is a belief that an
emergency is at hand-was coined in People v. Mitchell.110  In
Mitchell, the court authorized a warrantless search of hotel rooms
to locate a missing housekeeper who was ultimately found mur-
dered.111 To determine the reasonableness of the entry, the court
adopted a three-part test:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that
there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their
assistance for the protection of life or property[;] (2) [t]he
search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and
seize evidence[;] [and] (3) [t]here must be some reasonable ba-
sis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency
with the area or place to be searched.
112
Many cases from several jurisdictions apply the Mitchell test.113
Looking at this three-part test, it would make sense for other
courts to adopt it because it is a bright-line test that officers could
easily apply. But quite the opposite has happened. In fact, in
Brigham City v. Stuart, the United States Supreme Court elimi-
nated the motive requirement articulated in Mitchell.114  In
Brigham, the Court applied a rather distinct reasonableness test
and concluded that a police entry into a home was justified by the
need to prevent violence and restore order.115 It held that a war-
rantless entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, "regard-
less of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the circum-
stances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.'116 Essentially, the
Supreme Court eliminated the requirement of subjective good faith
as outlined in Mitchell.117 This adaptation of the Mitchell test does
not make sense, but it shows that courts vary in their interpretation
of the community caretaking doctrine in terms of how to define rea-
sonableness.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 608-09.
112. Id. at 609.
113. See, e.g., Guererri v. State, 922 A.2d 403, 407 n.7 (Del. 2007); Riggs v. State, 918
So.2d 274, 278-79 (Fla. 2005); People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 479 (Colo. 2002); State v. Fisher,
686 P.2d 750, 760-61 (Ariz. 1984).
114. 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
115. Id. at 406.
116. Id. at 404 (alteration in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting Scott v. United




Each court's decision to apply the community caretaking doctrine
seems arbitrary, to say the least. Some courts are eager to expand
the doctrine and give police more discretion.118 As John Wesley Hall
Jr. points out, the name "community caretaking exception" is "se-
ductive" because it convinces the public that warrantless searches
are justified and actually proper under the circumstances.119 Oth-
ers are eager to curb police discretion to afford greater protection to
individuals' constitutional rights. They view it as a "monstrous le-
viathan that could devour" Fourth Amendment search and seizure
protections.120 No one knows the right way to interpret the doc-
trine. The problem is clear: the United States Supreme Court has
written so little about the doctrine and has only referred to it spar-
ingly.121 Each case where it has referred to the doctrine has only
involved the warrantless searches of automobiles.122 As a result,
courts are stuck with weighing the best options. What they fail to
recognize, however, is that the best option is to eliminate the doc-
trine altogether.
IV. IT'S TIME TO OVERTURN CADY BECAUSE COURTS USE THE
DOCTRINE TO CIRCUMVENT INDIVIDUALS' FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS.
The United States Supreme Court should reverse the Cady deci-
sion because the community caretaking doctrine does not make a
warrantless search, which is presumptively unreasonable, reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the community care-
taking doctrine, which is an exception to the Fourth Amendment,
infringes on individuals' right to privacy. Only unreasonable
searches violate Fourth Amendment protections,123 and because the
search exception under the doctrine is unreasonable, it unconstitu-
tionally violates Fourth Amendment protections.
118. See Hudson, supra note 8.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
122. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 (holding that evidence discovered during inventory
search of van was admissible); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (holding that a routine inventory
search of a locked automobile did not involve an unreasonable search in violation of Fourth
Amendment); Cady, 413 U.S. at 433 (holding that warrantless search of a vehicle for a service
revolver under the community caretaking doctrine was reasonable).
123. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).
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Various exceptions, in addition to the community caretaking doc-
trine, to the Fourth Amendment have been established and recog-
nized by many courts.124 Consent, search incident to lawful arrest,
plain view, the automobile exception, and hot pursuit are just five
examples of exceptions to the warrant requirement.125 The fact pat-
tern must accommodate one of these exceptions in order for officers
to forgo the warrant requirement,126 and ultimately, many fact pat-
terns do. For the purposes of this article, I do not argue that all
exceptions, including the ones listed above, are unreasonable, and
consequently unconstitutional. Rather, recognizing the viability of
the community caretaking doctrine as an exception to Fourth
Amendment protections, on top of the other already recognized
ones, is unreasonable and unnecessary.
Restricting the number of exceptions and fact patterns eligible
for using the exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections can al-
low courts to better protect individuals from illegal searches and
seizures because it reduces the number of options that law enforce-
ment officers can sporadically choose from to circumvent their legal
duty to obtain a warrant.127 Courts can, and should, restrict the use
of the doctrine to advocate for the basic individual rights that our
founding fathers thought so important to include in the Bill of
Rights.
A. The Community Caretaking Doctrine Does Not Satisfy Strict
Scrutiny.
Law enforcement officers implicate an individual's Fourth
Amendment protection every time they enter an area where an in-
dividual has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.128
Entering this area, without a warrant, under the justification that
an officer is engaging in community caretaking functions is unrea-
sonable. It is unreasonable because without an investigatory pur-
pose, officers' search and seizure within a vehicle or home infringes
124. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, L. SHELF EDUC. MEDIA, http://law-




127. See Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, NAT'L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last vis-
ited Dec. 2, 2018) ("[T]here are so many exceptions that in practice warrants rarely are ob-
tained.").
128. Michael T. Pettry, The Emergency Aid Exception to the Fourth Amendment's Warrant





on an individual's constitutionally protected right of privacy. An
individual's right of privacy should not be violated because of an
arbitrary decision by officers that a person may be in danger or that
an officer is simply acting as a community caretaker. Thus, the
doctrine does not excuse officers for an unreasonable warrantless
search and seizure.
The right to privacy includes the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions without unjustified
governmental interference.129 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines it as "the right to be let alone.' 130 However the right of pri-
vacy is defined, it is of paramount importance to any society seeking
to use the community caretaking doctrine as a shield from liability.
Further, the right of privacy is considered a fundamental right.131
Although the Constitution does not mention the right of privacy in
the Bill of Rights, the right of privacy has been recognized as an
aspect of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.13 2 It is 'a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.'1 33 Despite the
Court's interest in protecting one's rights to privacy demonstrated
by some famous holdings,13 4 many courts infringe on the fundamen-
tal right to privacy by permitting law enforcement officers to engage
in the community caretaking doctrine. As such, a constitutional
analysis will show that the community caretaking doctrine cannot
make an unreasonable search and seizure reasonable because it
does not survive strict scrutiny.
Like other fundamental rights, the right of privacy is protected
by strict judicial scrutiny that offers no deference to legislative judg-
ment.13 5 "Though not absolute, fundamental rights may only be
limited upon proof that there is an extremely strong justification for
doing so. ' 136 Thus, "[a]ny law impinging on a fundamental right
will be struck down unless the government can prove that the law
in question is precisely tailored to achieve a compelling state inter-
est."
137
129. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
132. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684.
133. Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
134. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
135. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Right ofPrivacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 971, 979-80 (2006).




First, it is clear that the community caretaking doctrine limits
individuals' rights to privacy and Fourth Amendment protections
because it allows courts to use evidence obtained through a war-
rantless search and seizure against a defendant in a trial. However,
use of the doctrine may be justified if it serves a compelling state
interest. Arguably, though, there is no compelling state interest
that justifies use of the community caretaking doctrine when there
are so many other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that offic-
ers regularly use to engage in many of the same functions. Consent,
search incident to lawful arrest, the plain view exception, the auto-
mobile exception, and the hot pursuit exception are just five exam-
ples of exceptions to the warrant requirement.13 8 For example, un-
der the plain view exception, law enforcement officers are permitted
to seize incriminating evidence if it is in plain view and if the offic-
ers have legally entered the premises.13 9 Under the community
caretaking doctrine, law enforcement officers similarly can seize in-
criminating evidence.140 Moreover, it is clear the state's interest in
protecting citizens and attending to their needs is already accom-
plished by the many other exceptions the legislature has carved out
for emergency situations.
In addition, another exception would serve as a burden on law
enforcement officers. Officers would have to consider which excep-
tion would be the most appropriate to implicate in order to shield
themselves from liability and ensure that the potentially illegally
obtained evidence could still be used in a court of law. Imposing
this additional burden would not be a compelling state interest be-
cause it would complicate matters for law enforcement officers, who
are simply trying to take care of the community. Indeed, the com-
munity caretaking doctrine does not satisfy strict scrutiny.
B. The Community Caretaking Doctrine Cannot Make an Unrea-
sonable Search Reasonable Because of its Chilling Effect.
In addition, taking away or infringing on an individual's right of
privacy by recognizing the community caretaking doctrine has a se-
vere chilling effect, especially on those who want to seek help, but
do not for fear of being incriminated of a crime. One example is a
domestic violence situation, wherein a woman who has been beaten
or abused severely refuses to call the police because she has drugs





in her home. Another example comes from a case in Pennsylva-
nia.141 The appellant in the case was pulled over onto the right
shoulder of the road.142 Her engine was running, but the hazard
lights were not activated.14 3 An officer, traveling northbound, saw
the appellant's vehicle, activated his emergency lights, and pulled
alongside her vehicle.1 44 The appellant was "sitting in the driver's
seat and appeared to be entering an address into her vehicle's nav-
igation system.1 4 5 The officer described the appellant as "glossy
eye[d]" and "looking through [him]. 1 46 The officer then pulled his
vehicle in front of appellant's and approached her on foot.147 The
officer, suspecting that appellant had been drinking, asked appel-
lant to exit the vehicle and undergo a field sobriety test.148 The test
revealed that appellant had a blood alcohol content of .205%, and
she was subsequently arrested and charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUI).149 The appellant moved to suppress the
evidence of the DUI on the ground that it was an illegal investiga-
tory stop.150 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that there
was in fact an illegal investigatory stop.
151
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Superior Court
erred in upholding the appellant's charges because requiring the
appellant to take a field sobriety test was not justified under the
community caretaking doctrine.152 Despite ultimately reaching the
correct conclusion, the appellant was arrested in June of 2013, and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision was not rendered until
November of 2017.153 For four years, the appellant's constitutional
rights were cast aside on the grounds that the police had more im-
portant, community caretaking functions to attend to.
Despite reaching the correct conclusion with regards to the ap-
pellant's case in particular, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took
141. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017) (recognizing the public serv-
ant exception as a category within the community caretaking doctrine, which this article will
not be addressing).








150. Id. at 615.
151. Id. at 614.
152. Id. at 614, 627.
153. Id. at 613.
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the opportunity to recognize the community caretaking doctrine ex-
ception to the warrant requirement.154 However, this was error.
Again, this exception exists to provide yet another avenue that
courts can take to admit incriminating evidence. Although the ap-
pellant's rights in this case were eventually recognized, the bigger
problem is that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court effectively pro-
vided officers an avenue to circumvent the warrant requirement.
V. IF WE KEEP THE CADY HOLDING, LET'S LIMIT THE CADY
DECISION TO THE CADY CIRCUMSTANCES.
At the same time as saying the community caretaking doctrine is
a viable exception to the Fourth Amendment, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court was very clear to restrict application of the community
caretaking doctrine to vehicles, refusing to address the question of
whether it is a violation of individual rights to recognize the excep-
tion with regard to homes.155 It is clear that case law unanimously
recognizes the doctrine to apply to vehicles.156 Because many courts
refuse to engage in the debate regarding homes altogether, courts
should take the guesswork out by refusing to construe the doctrine
to include the warrantless searches of homes.
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that law enforcement of-
ficers can search a vehicle without a warrant as a result of their
community caretaking function, it has not ruled on whether com-
munity caretaking can justify a warrantless search in a home. In
fact, the Supreme Court has referred to the doctrine sparingly.
157
The doctrine has only been referenced by the Court in Cady, Opper-
man, and Bertine.158 Each of these decisions carefully invoked the
doctrine only in the context of automobiles.159 Moreover, in each
case, the Court was clear to recognize the distinction between the
home and the automobile.160 For example, in Opperman, the Court
stated that it "has traditionally drawn a distinction between auto-
mobiles and homes or offices in relation to the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 16 1 Further, many circuits have interpreted this language to
154. Id. at 638.
155. Id. at 618 (describing the issue on review as whether a reasonable motorist would
feel free to leave prior to the approaching officer stopping to interact with her).
156. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
157. See Hudson, supra note 8.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
161. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367.
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restrict expansion of the doctrine. For example, the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits restricted the doctrine on the grounds that protect-
ing the sanctity of the home has been a staple motivation since the
beginning of our nation.16 2 Scaling back the doctrine to exclude
warrantless searches of homes, then, is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent. Using the doctrine to conduct a warrantless
search of a vehicle is the only constitutionally protected interpreta-
tion.
The United States Supreme Court did not intend the doctrine to
be used to authorize a warrantless search and seizure within the
home. For the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the Court stated
that there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.163
Officers come into contact with vehicles more frequently.16 4 States
require vehicles to be registered and licensed.16 5 States have en-
acted codes to regulate the condition and manner in which vehicles
are kept.166 "[T]he extent of police-citizen contact involving" vehi-
cles is "substantially greater than police-citizen contact" involving
homes.16 7 Following the extensive discussion about the difference
between homes and vehicles, the Court confined the doctrine to the
vehicle, making it clear that the Court's intent was to restrict use
of the doctrine to the vehicle.
168
If Congress' intent is not persuasive, then, at the very least, the
right of privacy should be. The doctrine should not be extended to
the home because the right of privacy is at its height within the
home, and conducting searches and seizures within the home with-
out a warrant is a severe violation of both an individual's Fourth
Amendment protection and right of privacy.16 9 The home was first
deemed a sanctuary in 1966,170 and is still considered a sanctuary
almost fifty years later.171 Further, courts have already recognized
that a person's home in particular receives a heightened level of
162. See United States v. Erickson, 532 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d
204, 208 (7th Cir. 1982).
163. Cady, 413 U.S. at 442.




168. Id. at 441-42.
169. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004).
170. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
171. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (recognizing the home provides a
kind of special sanctuary in modern life).
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protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.172 In Silver-
man v. United States, the United States Supreme Court determined
that the actions of police officers in attaching an electronic device
to a heating duct in the defendant's home constituted a violation of
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.173 As a result, the con-
versations that the officers heard as a result were inadmissible in
court.174 More recently, in Groh v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court
stated that the warrantless search of a person's home is presump-
tively unreasonable.175 In Groh, the defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated because the search warrant was facially
invalid because it failed to describe the persons or things to be
seized in particular.176
The doctrine should also be scaled back because the Supreme
Court contradicts itself in its own case law, making it extremely
unclear what interests the lower courts should be seeking to pro-
tect.177 Lower courts are left with determining whether an individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment rights should be protected, whether the
perpetrator should be caught at the expense of those Fourth
Amendment rights, whether an individual's safety is paramount to
his or her own Fourth Amendment rights, or whether one's expec-
tation of privacy is more important.178 Indeed, to eliminate confu-
sion and restore confidence in police officers, the community care-
taking doctrine, affording officers the ability to enter homes without
a warrant, should not be accepted by courts. Officers, in using this
exception, can hide from liability by cherry-picking which right they
thought to be most important, and use that to justify their decision.
If courts continue to give credence to the community caretaking
doctrine's applicability within the home, which has not been ex-
pressly allowed by the Supreme Court, courts will effectively be cre-
ating a slippery slope wherein officers can use the doctrine to say
172. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmen-
tal intrusion.").
173. Id. at 511-12.
174. Id. at 512.
175. 540 U.S. 551, 552 (2004).
176. Id.
177. Compare Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (distinguishing a search from
the home from the search of a vehicle, and holding that the community caretaking doctrine
is limited to the search of vehicles), with Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 500 (1978) (holding
that the police and firefighters had searched the home in accordance with the Fourth Amend-
ment, but did not diminish any reasonable person's expectation of privacy nor the Fourth
Amendment protection because the "purpose [was] to ascertain the cause of [the] fire rather
than to look for evidence of a crime .... ").
178. See Michigan, 436 U.S. at 499.
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they are engaging in community caretaking functions, but are ac-
tually investigating crimes. I fear that as technology advances, so
too will the exceptions that allow officers to invade the privacy of
those devices.179 As the Court in Carpenter v. United States stated,
the Fourth Amendment was drafted to be tied to common-law tres-
pass and intrusions by the government on physical property, not
the new "phenonemenon" of cell phone signals.18 0 Arguably, officers
can use the community caretaking doctrine in particular to ignore
Fourth Amendment protections when citizens are in trouble and
when officers would not otherwise have access to cell phone records.
The fact that there are already so many other exceptions shows
courts' willingness to continue to create exceptions to accommodate
for technology advances and lifestyle changes. This needs to stop,
right here, right now, with the community caretaking doctrine.
VI. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DOCTRINE CAN STAND, BUT THE
FRUITS OF THE SEARCH MUST BE SUPPRESSED UNDER AN
EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
Proponents of the community caretaking doctrine argue that the
doctrine was designed in good faith, by "a desire to aid victims ra-
ther than investigate criminals."1 8 1 The Supreme Court of Dela-
ware describes the basis for the community caretaking doctrine as
follows:
The modern police officer is a 'jack-of-all-emergencies,' with
'complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to identify-
ing and apprehending persons committing serious criminal of-
fenses'; by default or design he is also expected 'to aid individ-
uals who are in danger of physical harm,' 'assist hose who can-
not care for themselves,' and 'provide other services on an
emergency basis.' To require reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity before police can investigate and render assistance in
these situations would severely hamstring their ability to pro-
tect and serve the public.
18 2
There is no doubt this is true. If the community caretaking doc-
trine is to stand, as is, it would undoubtedly allow law enforcement
179. But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (holding that in light
of the immense storage capacity of modern cell phones, "police officers must generally obtain
a warrant before searching the contents of a phone").
180. Id. at 2213, 2216.
181. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 627 (Pa. 2017) (quoting State v. Ryon,
108 P.3d 1032, 1043 (N.M. 2005)).
182. Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 216-17 (Del. 2008) (footnote omitted).
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to provide services and aid individuals who need help. Further, it
is unlikely that courts will refuse to acknowledge the doctrine alto-
gether. There is Supreme Court precedent, albeit very little, that
plainly recognizes the validity of the doctrine.
Thus, as an alternative to getting rid of the doctrine altogether,
or even scaling the doctrine back, courts should continue to allow
law enforcement officers to use the doctrine as an exception to get-
ting a warrant on only one condition: any incriminating evidence
that officers find should be suppressed at later hearings.
Since Mapp v. Ohio,183 exclusion of incriminating evidence ob-
tained unlawfully has been the norm, and awarding damages for
the unlawful behavior has been the exception.18 4 Some commenta-
tors, including Wayne R. LaFave, have argued for an exclusionary
rule for evidence found during community caretaking searches.185
An exclusionary rule would, in effect, deter police from entering
premises without a warrant under the community caretaking justi-
fication, when actually motivated by law-enforcement concerns.
186
Moreover, it would achieve a practical solution to the problem of
law enforcement officers using a community caretaking search.187
Opponents of an exclusionary rule argue that the Supreme Court
has never required exclusion where police action has been reasona-
ble; rather, an exclusionary rule has only ever applied where con-
stitutional rights have been infringed.188 Unless the officers have
acted blamefully, courts refuse to invoke the exclusionary rem-
edy.189 Other critics of the exclusionary rule argue that the rule, in
effect, really only benefits those that are actually guilty of a
crime.190 The rule is typically invoked in criminal cases where the
only reason to suppress the evidence is if it leads to the conclusion
that the defendant is guilty.191 In fact, some critics argue that the
injury suffered by the person seeking suppression is severely miti-
gated when, although an officer may not have had probable cause
183. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
184. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,
910 (1991).
185. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 6.6(a) (5th ed. 2018).
186. Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking Assistance
Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1558
(2009).
187. See Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("This [exclusion-
ary rule] appears to be a legitimate means of encouraging genuine police caretaking functions
while deterring bogus or pretextual police activities.").
188. Dimino, supra note 186, at 1559.
189. Id. at 1559-60.




to believe, for example, that there was cocaine in the trunk of a de-
fendant's car, there was in fact cocaine in the trunk, and in hind-
sight, the officer had probable cause.
192
Nonetheless, an exclusionary rule would be most appropriate.
First, courts have difficulties "valuing" the harm caused by illegal
searches and seizures in order to assess damages.193 Under an ex-
clusionary rule, courts do not have to deal with the valuing prob-
lem.194 They do not have to price anything; all they have to do is
suppress evidence.195 Second, an exclusionary rule deters police
misconduct because many searches are motivated by a desire to
catch and punish criminals, at the expense of violating basic consti-
tutional rights.196 The exclusionary rule takes away this "gain" that
officers receive when they discover fruits in a search that were un-
lawfully obtained.197 Third, it mitigates police perjury.198 Officers
may tend to distort the evidence that was available at the time of
the search to qualify themselves for protection under a warrant.199
One example of police perjury includes an officer concocting a "fic-
titious 'tip' that provides a series of incriminating details, corre-
sponding exactly to facts the officer observed" when conducting the
search.2
00
VII. CONCLUSION: IT'S TIME FOR SOME CHANGE.
If one thing is clear after reading this article, it should be this:
the community caretaking doctrine is just another superfluous ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment that needs to go. First, the doc-
trine is confusing to courts who are trying to interpret and apply it.
This is demonstrated by the inconsistencies between courts' inter-
pretations. Second, the doctrine does not satisfy strict scrutiny, es-
pecially because it invades the sanctity of the home.
I recognize the difficulties of overturning Supreme Court prece-
dent. Thus, at a minimum, if law enforcement officers gain incrim-
inating evidence after engaging in community caretaking functions,
an exclusionary rule should apply because it is unfair to allow in-
criminating evidence to be used against a defendant at trial when
all the defendant wanted was help. Nevertheless, an exclusionary
192. Id. at 912.
193. Id. at 910.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 910-11.
197. Id.
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rule would not be necessary if courts simply recognized what Cady
actually said about the applicability of the doctrine-that the doc-
trine applies solely in the context of vehicles.

